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Abstract
Over the past two decades, earmarked funding to international development
organizations through special-purpose trust funds has increased greatly. This
paper studies the incentives for trust funds from the perspective of multi-
lateral agencies, notably the World Bank. A theoretically intriguing type of
funds are so-called “pass-on funds,” in which one unit hosts the fund, then
passes on its resources to another type of unit for implementation. Each unit
has different preferences for the specific types of activities to be supported
by the fund. Interviews with World Bank staff and complementary docu-
ments demonstrate the rationale for pass-on funds and the associated division
of labor between fundraising network units and implementing regional units.
While pass-on funds reflect an efficient division of labor between function-
ally specialized units, they increase the misalignment between sector-specific
global priorities and country-specific needs. Organizational reform drove the
sudden explosion of pass-on funds around the millennium turn, facilitated by
growing availability of donor monies for specific sectors and by lenient inter-
nal regulation. Organizational reform undermined budget autonomy of sector
units, causing those units to seek new funds in their areas of expertise. A num-
ber of reform features also reduced administrative budgets of country units,
increasing their demand for pass-on funding grants. The results contribute
to the emerging literature on earmarked funding and highlight the need to
consider international organizations as heterogeneous actors.
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Trust funds, channeling grant resources to international development organizations
for specific development purposes, have become an important tool in the global
aid architecture. Trust funds are popular with donors because of their tremendous
flexibility, compared to traditional sources of multilateral finance (e.g., OECD 2011;
Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2016; Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017).
While trust funds have proliferated in the last twenty years, their governance
arrangements also have become increasingly complex. An exemplary case of such
complexity is represented by the so-called “pass-on funds” at the World Bank. Un-
like trust funds that individual units raise to support their own work program,
pass-on funds entail a division of labor within the multilateral bureaucracy, with a
global sector unit raising the funds, managing the overall program, and relating to
donors relations, while a country unit implements the programs financed by these
funds. This feature raises important theoretical questions. How do pass-on funds
emerge? What makes this institutional arrangement beneficial to the relevant units?
Which conditions sustain the implied division of labor? A related question pertains
to timing. Why did pass-on funds take off suddenly around the millennium turn?
This paper answers these questions by studying the related historical develop-
ments at the World Bank. While focused on the World Bank, the present analysis
may be generalized to all international development organizations. All major inter-
national development organizations consist of headquarters and field offices, with
headquarters often developing sector-specific programs and field offices implement-
ing these program-supported activities at the country level. At the World Bank,
“Sector Managing Units” (SMUs) prepare specific projects, while “Country Manag-
ing Units” (CMUs) interact with recipient countries and manage project portfolios
in multiple sectors. This division of labor delivers quality projects relevant to spe-
cific country needs, but functional specialization also perpetuates differences among
different units. Country units emphasize specific country needs while sector units
also promote their sectors irrespective of geographical boundaries.
In addition to describing recent trust fund history and development of pass-on
funds, this paper explores goal conflicts and bargaining processes in functionally
differentiated organizations (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Weaver 2008; Gra-
editors of this issue, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this paper. I benefited
greatly from fruitful exchange with Patrick Bayer, Sebastian Fehrler, Tobias Lechtenfeld, Skip
Lupia, Daniel Magleby, Carlo Prato, and Maik Schneider.
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(e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Caughey, Cohon, and Chatfield 2009; Bauer
and Ege 2016), and determinants of trust funds. Previous studies on the determi-
nants of trust funds emphasize the donor perspective, some arguing that trust funds
allow donors to regain control over unfaithful agents (Sridhar and Woods 2013),
others focusing on divisions among donors to explain why trust funds have prolifer-
ated (Graham 2015; Bayram and Graham 2016; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack
2016). Motivations for multilateral agencies to establish trust funds have not been
systematically analyzed, though they have been discussed cursorily (e.g., Michaelowa
and Michaelowa 2011; Mahn 2012; Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer 2015).
A focus on pass-on funds facilitates more thorough analysis of agency motiva-
tions and generates new explanations for trust funds beyond the obvious explanation
that agencies use the funds to grow their budgets. Organizational reforms can play
a key role by generating powerful incentives to create new funds. For example, the
“Strategic Compact” reforms initiated by the World Bank in 1997 undermined bud-
get autonomy of sector units, which encouraged these units to use pass-on funds to
regain autonomy. While the rapid growth of pass-on funds may help the World Bank
increase its position against multilateral competitors, it most likely undermined on-
going efforts to increase the relevance of development projects for specific country
priorities. Because pass-on funds represent sector interests at the global level, they
inherently ignore specific country interests (IEG 2011).
My analysis draws primarily on qualitative evidence from semi-structured in-
terviews conducted at the World Bank headquarters in 2013, augmented by trust
fund program documents, annual budget reports, and evaluation studies from the
World Bank. My choice of method recognizes that the creation of pass-on funds as
a specific form of financing is a singular event, but once established, pass-on funds
involve repeated interactions between host units and implementing units that can be
studied quantitatively. There is an apparent link between the reasons for establish-
ment of pass-on funds and patterns governing their use. Web Appendix A provides
additional evidence consistent with the findings presented here.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses historical developments of trust funds at
the World Bank, introduces the phenomenon of pass-on funds, and specifies research
questions. Section 3 reviews theoretical literature on trust funds, identifies current
gaps, and demonstrates how analyzing pass-on funds enhances our understanding
of international organizations. Section 4 explores potential explanations for the rise
of pass-on funds. Section 5 presents original empirical analysis drawing on the case
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functioning of the World Bank and probes the potential for generalization beyond
the World Bank context. It also reassesses some prevailing arguments in the relevant
theoretical literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The rise of pass-on funds at the World Bank
Pass-on funds are a special type of trust fund involving a particular division of labor
between at least two units of an international development organization. One unit
hosts the fund, maintaining donor relations and allocating program funds to specific
projects, and at least one other unit implements specific projects supported by the
fund.
Pass-on funds are common in larger multilateral agencies such as the United
Nations which comprise a bundle of functionally specialized entities. Under the
pooled funding mechanism, administered by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office,
the United Nations Development Program allocates pass-on fund resources to multi-
ple entities that implement resources according to their own operating procedures.1
The World Bank often uses the term “global funds” to characterize pass-on funds,
because their sector programs often have global scope. However, “pass-on fund”
is a more appropriate term as it emphasizes the institutional arrangement among
distinct organizational units.2 This institutional arrangement involves the so-called
“network anchors” as hosts and the regional units as implementers. The reverse
arrangement in host-user relations is rare. As shown in Figure 1, regional units pri-
marily use trust funds received from other units, but also raise their own funds that
cannot benefit other units. Conversely, network units mostly host funds intended
for implementation in another unit, while also raising funds to support their own
work program.3 These patterns indicate a division of labor by which network units
host trust funds and pass them on to regional units, which motivates the pass-on
funds terminology. The patterns also reflect the country-based assistance model of
the World Bank.
1 See http://mptf.undp.org/overview/funds (accessed August 15, 2016)
2 Despite some overlap, the terms are not interchangeable. All current global funds are pass-on
funds, but not all pass-on funds are global (but sometimes regional). Moreover, my definition of
pass-on funds also excludes financial intermediary funds because the pass-on logic does not apply
to the Bank but across international organizations.
3 For a disaggregated presentation of host-user relations at the level of individual units, see
Web Appendix B3.
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`abcde Figure shows the relative distribution of trust fund grants during FY 2002-13 aggregated
over all regional units and all network units. Bar labels indicate total numbers of trust-funded
grants.
Source: World Bank (2013g)
At the World Bank, the growth of has increased rapidly. In 1999, there were
virtually zero pass-on funds, by 2005 there were 40, and by 2010 the number peaked
at 110 (Figure 2). Furthermore, their significance in the overall trust fund business
is significant. Over fiscal years (FY) 2002-13 — the longest time span for which
data are available — 37% of all donor contributions went to global funds, which rely
on pass-on funding mechanisms.4 An individual pass-on fund may support multiple
activities, thus there are many more pass-on fund supported activities than there
are pass-on funds. For example, in FY 2010, the Bank had 110 active pass-on funds,
but all active pass-on funds together disbursed 2,071 individual grants (World Bank
2013h).
Pass-on funds funds are also significant in terms of grant volumes. The total size
of pass-on funds in FY 2004 was USD 750 million, which doubled to USD 1.5 billion
in FY 2011. This figure is almost half the expenditure from IBRD/IDA trust funds
over this period. The USD 1.5 billion of pass-on funds in FY 2011 was roughly 15%
of the total grant amount committed by the World Bank to its client countries that
4 Note that Figure 2 only refers to IBRD/IDA trust funds, trust funds administered by the
World Bank that benefit its own programs. For introductions to World Bank trust funds, see
World Bank (2013a-b).
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 Thick lines show the total number of active pass-on funds minus terminated funds in a
fiscal year by unit type. Individual dots of corresponding color show unit-specific data. The figure
excludes trust funds involving the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
Source: World Bank (2013h)
year (as the grant volume equaled USD 10 billion in FY 2011).
The rapid expansion of pass-on funds contrasts with the more gradual devel-
opment of other types of funds at the World Bank. While pass-on funds are a
novel phenomenon, trust funds in general are not. In fact, the World Bank and
other multilateral organizations have long-standing experience with trust funds to
support specific development initiatives. The World Bank established its first trust
fund in 1960, when several donors sought to co-finance the Indus Basin Project in
Pakistan.5 Since 1960, trust funds grew slowly and were primarily vehicles for the
Bank to participate in partnership programs, for example the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, the
World Bank started establishing a number of consultant trust funds with bilateral
5 Technically speaking, the International Development Association (IDA), also created in 1960,
was the first trust fund. However, because of its broad mandate and its nearly universal mem-
bership, IDA is not considered a trust fund in the common sense of funding earmarked for special
purposes.
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funds to address emerging development issues, for example post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, good governance, and environmental protection (Barakat, Rzeszut, and Martin
2012: 13).
In many of these trust funds, individual sector or regional units raised their own
resources to support their operational work. They are called “own funds” in this
paper. This is a broad term for a range of funds with different purposes. Own
funds have steadily grown for decades and continue to be a significant element of
grant funding at the World Bank and other multilateral organizations. Own funds
allow individual units to expand their work program and hence will be established
as the opportunity arises. A given unit has much flexibility in the design of own
funds, which implies that they remain close to actual needs while having a lenient
institutional structure (Reinsberg 2016).
In contrast, the benefits from pass-on funds may not be reaped without certain
costs. Focusing on trust funds that support country operations, program effective-
ness hinges on the type of funding source, notably, whether the country unit raises its
own fund or whether it is supported by a pass-on fund. An independent evaluation
reports that “[s]ingle-country trust funds are generally adapted to country situations
and work well; this is less true for global funds that support multiple countries —
many of which poorly integrate and coordinate their support at the country level”
(IEG 2011: 25). From the perspective of World Bank management, pass-on funds
are double-edged swords: They help the organization stay relevant on global issues
despite its country-focused assistance model (IEG 2011: 9), but the funds may also
undermine efforts in other priority areas such as increasing the relevance of World
Bank operations for recipient countries. It may not be a coincidence that long after
the World Bank decentralized its operations to field offices, the alignment of opera-
tions with country needs remains remarkably poor (IEG 2011: viii). Pass-on funds
warrant closer examination partly because they can alter how multilateral agencies
work. The significant size and sudden growth of these funds in the World Bank
require explanation and provide the empirical basis of this paper.
In addition, pass-on funds raise interesting theoretical questions. Why do pass-
on funds exist at all? Which factors explain the sudden explosion of pass-on funds at
the millennium turn? The first question touches on the rationale for pass-on funds.
While this question can be studied from a donor perspective, I employ an intra-
agency perspective in order to better understand the incentives for the individual
units involved. It appears to be puzzling that implementing units rely on pass-on
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could better target the funds to their specific needs if the funds were housed in their
own unit. Moreover, it is unknown what motivates host units to raise trust funds
that they do not use to implement programs themselves. The case of pass-on funds
hence seems to reflect an interesting case of functional differentiation at multilateral
organizations and increased intra-organizational bargaining.
The second question concerns the timing of pass-on funds. Which factors came
together at the millennium turn that explain the sudden takeoff of pass-on funds?
It is clear that the usefulness of the funds alone does not explain the timing of their
sudden growth; however, the factors underlying this new trend are yet unexplored.
The goals of this paper are to establish the general case for pass-on funds, to trace
the origins of pass-on funds, and to explore resulting bigger lessons for international
organizations theory.
3 Theoretical perspectives
While my paper relates directly to the emerging literature on trust funds, I elaborate
more broadly on debates in international relations, organizational theory, and the
public choice of international bureaucracies for which the study of pass-on funds
may bring about new insights.
Trust funds are a new mechanism of multilateral development finance. From an
empirical perspective, the new multi-bi aid dataset provides opportunities to study
trends in earmarked aid for a prolonged time period (Eichenauer and Reinsberg
2017). From a theoretical perspective, the rise of trust funds can be studied within a
principal-agent framework. The principals are the member states, acting collectively
through the governing board or individually as donors, while the agent represents the
multilateral bureaucracy (e.g., Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson,
and Tierney 2006; Johnson and Urpelainen 2014).
Trust fund research using the principal-agent framework is primarily from the
donor perspective (e.g., Sridhar andWoods 2013; Eichenauer and Hug 2015; Graham
2015). For example, Sridhar and Woods (2013) coin the term “Trojan multilateral-
ism” to refer to the risk of global funds undermining universal multilateralism, and
conclude these funds exist because of the problem of agency slack. By earmark-
ing their financial contributions, donors reduce the policy discretion of their agent
and hence increase donors’ collective control. For example, donors influenced the
World Health Organization by using the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis
8
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the main driver for earmarked funding. Graham (2016) argues that earmarked con-
tributions are the joint product of divergent preferences regarding policies and finan-
cial costs of multilateral activities. Moreover, Eichenauer and Hug (2015) study the
choice of funding channel when special-purpose trust funds become available, taking
into account the role of voting rules at multilateral organizations. Finally, Reins-
berg, Michaelowa, and Knack (2016) study donor participation decisions in World
Bank trust funds and present evidence to suggest that individual donors trade off
gains from burden-sharing in funds with more donors against gains in control in
funds with fewer donors. The present paper provides a complementary perspective
to these studies by exploring potential explanations for trust funds that explicitly
focus on the multilateral agency perspective. This change of perspective provides
some new insights, for example that trust funds rarely result from unfaithful agents
and more often result from unfaithful principals.
A key debate in studies of international organization relates to the sources of
autonomy of multilateral agencies. Recent literature makes significant steps to mea-
sure autonomy more precisely (e.g., Brown 2010; Conceic¸a˜o-Heldt 2013; Bauer and
Ege 2016). For an agent to be autonomous with respect to the principal(s), it needs
to have autonomous preferences as well as autonomous resources (e.g. Barnett and
Finnemore 2004; Cortell and Peterson 2006; Caughey, Cohon, and Chatfield 2009;
Bauer and Ege 2016). It is an open debate whether or not trust funds increase the
autonomy of multilateral agents. From a donor perspective, earmarked funding con-
strains the agent, especially when the same donors that provide earmarked funding
simultaneously reduce their core funding (e.g., UN 2012; Sridhar and Woods 2013;
Browne and Weiss 2014). From an agency perspective, however, earmarked fund-
ing multiplies the available choices, especially when agencies manage to broaden
the donor base. In that way, agencies can exploit differences among the donors for
their own benefit (e.g., Bryner 1987; Wilson 1989; Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006).
Unless donors establish controls costly to them — contract precision, appointment
procedures, monitoring agents, “shadow bureaucracies” (e.g., Nielson and Tierney
2003; Dijkstra 2015; Parizek 2016) — agent autonomy grows with the resources un-
der control. Therefore, it is widely assumed that bureaucracies attempt to maximize
their budgets and grow their staff (e.g., Frey 1984; Vaubel 1986; Vaubel, Dreher,
and Soylu 2007). Some researchers argue that agents want independence from their
principals wherever possible (e.g., Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Hawkins and Jacoby
2006; Johnson 2014).
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pals. This ignores that such autonomy may not be the same for every unit inside
a multilateral bureaucracy. In general, different units within the same organization
may have different preferences (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 724). Different units
might also have different access to external resources. For both reasons, considering
agencies as heterogeneous actors may be necessary in some contexts for the concept
of agent autonomy to be sensible.
In addition, the struggle for autonomy may not be limited to the principal-agent
relationship. In fact, this struggle also occurs within a collective agent. While it
had long been argued in the domestic context that bureaucrats strive for power,
prestige, security, and loyalty (Downs 1967; Fiorina and Noll 1979; Breton and
Wintrobe 1982), the power struggles within international bureaucracies tend to be
neglected. As an exception, Graham (2013) provides case evidence from the World
Health Organization that headquarters in Geneva were unable to control local field
offices, causing country programs in health systems to be poorly connected to the
donors’ goals embraced at headquarters. No study of trust funds exists to date
that uses these insights, leaving important gaps in our understanding of trust funds.
Current explanations do not adequately account for the emergence of certain types
of trust funds. In this paper, I provide an explanation for the rise of pass-on funds
by studying their implications on the intra-organizational patterns of authority.
Recent literature particularly from organizational theory emphasizes the role of
organizational structure (e.g., Gehring 2009; Trondal 2013; Bauer and Ege 2016).
Organizational structures that provide for more local input may be crucial for project
performance. Honig (2015) shows that such features have a strong impact precisely
when local conditions are highly unpredictable, for example in fragile states. Tron-
dal (2013) shows that organization by purpose engenders a logic of portfolio, while
organization by process engenders a logic of hierarchy, and both behavioral logics
have different implications on performance. However, demonstrating that organiza-
tional structure influences autonomy faces the challenge of endogeneity, which might
exist because states design institutions rationally with a view to desired outcomes
(e.g., Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Nonetheless,
organizational theory is useful as it can inform the debate on the determinants of
institutional design. Budgetary pressure may lead to reorganization and specifi-
cally more centralization in the budget procedure, whether it was anticipated by the
principal or not (Goetz and Patz 2016). More generally, there is a debate on the
determinants of (de)centralization. For instance, agencies may centralize to avoid
10
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ized units (Trondal 2012: 435). Conversely, decentralization may reap the benefits
of functional specialization. Considering the insights from organizational theory, I
will argue that the institutional arrangement of pass-on funds follows a functional
logic.
4 Potential explanations for pass-on funds
The puzzle of pass-on funds has two parts, one on the existence of pass-on funds and
the other on their timing. For the static part of the puzzle, I draw on a functionalist
argument. For the dynamic part, I take the principal-agent framework as a point
of departure, discussing both donor-centered explanations and an agency-centered
explanation.
Consider the question why pass-on funds exist at all. Certain units have compar-
ative advantages in certain tasks and hence specialize in those; for example, sector
units have expertise in global themes, and country units have unique country knowl-
edge. These facts alone might explain why each type of unit raises its own funds
in their relevant area of expertise, but they cannot explain the division of labor in
pass-on funds. Organizational theory suggests that the process-driven allocation of
responsibilities establishes hierarchy (Trondal 2013). Arguably, such hierarchy will
only be acceptable in the presence of mutual benefits: Sector staff have better access
to global funding than regional units and regional units have better capacities for
implementation than sector units.6
In the timing of the rise of pass-on funds, two perspectives can be distinguished
within the principal-agent framework. While the donor perspective relates pass-on
funds to specific donor motivations, the agent perspective emphasizes the multilat-
eral bureaucracy’s motivations. From the donor perspective, one potential expla-
nation for pass-on funds relates to the collective desire to increase control over the
bureaucratic agent. Theoretically, unfaithfulness of the agent is a risk of delegation
(e.g., Niskanen 1973; Vaubel 1986; Dunleavy 1991), and agent control mechanisms
abound (e.g., Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lake and McCubbins 2006; Dijkstra 2015;
Parizek 2016). Empirically, the creation of the Global Fund (to Fight Aids, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria) can be rationalized by the desire of the donors to control the
World Health Organization (Sridhar and Woods 2013). By analogy, one could ar-
6 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the idea of functional differentiation.
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of competition for funds. This strategy suggests that principals could create one
big thematic fund and let country offices compete with good projects rather than
delegating authority directly to country offices. For this control mechanism to be
effective, donors would need to replace direct delegation to country offices (which
is also difficult to screen) with indirect delegation via pass-on funds. An observ-
able implication of this mechanism would be a structural break in the number of
own funds or even a reduction in the number of own funds hosted at the regional
units. However, available evidence suggests the contrary. Own funds in the regional
units have continued to grow, even after the emergence of pass-on funds (see Web
Appendix B2).
Another donor-centered explanation relies on preference divergence within the
collective principal. By using pass-on funds, a donor with diverging preferences can
reinforce a specific sector in which it has a salient interest and which the hosting
unit addresses through the trust fund. While the donor actually aims at gaining
leverage in the intergovernmental policy discussions, a by-product of its strategy is
the empowerment of a specific sector unit inside the agency. This mechanism has
two observable implications. One would be a similar rise in the number of own
funds in the relevant sector units that are being empowered. Another would be a
positive relationship between measures of salient donor interest in a given sector
and the number of pass-on funds in the same sector. The available evidence for
these implications is limited though. The growth of own funds in the network units
started in the mid-1990s and halted in FY 2003 (see Figure B1 in Web Appendix B2).
Moreover, there appears to be no robust relationship between trust fund membership
and chairmanship in the relevant working group at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2016).7
From a multilateral agency perspective, pass-on funds may be a result of “de-
funct delegation.” This possibility follows the recent turn in principal-agent studies
to focus on the behavior of the principals. Defunct delegation can occur in cases of
principal shirking, principal drift, and principal subversion — opportunistic behav-
ior by individual members of the collective principal (Elsig 2011: 498). For example,
principal shirking occurs when member states do not pay their dues. This is a pri-
7 The case may be different for preference divergence on recipient countries. Such divergence
may lead to more country-specific funds. Note however that a minority of trust funds have a
prespecified target country.
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(e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Vaubel 2006). The
other two defects are equally intimidating because they may reduce the perceived
legitimacy of the agent, which is required to ensure the long-term viability of the
agency (e.g., Haas 1964; Suchman 1995; Weaver 2007). For these reasons, the agent
will respond to these defects because they threaten its autonomy. It is well known
that not only states shape the environment for multilateral agencies but also certain
multilaterals sometimes define the environment for states (Brechin and Ness 2013;
Johnson 2014; Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). To regain autonomy, agencies can
diversify their resource base (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004: 232), build alliances with
non-state actors (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006), and form cartels with some competi-
tors (Vaubel 1986), while reducing resource flows to other direct competitors (Posner
2009).
Someone must act on behalf of the agency. If agencies are assumed to be unitary
actors, who acts does not matter, but a high level of actorness is required. This
makes unitary-actor explanations for the emergence of pass-on funds unlikely, as
there would need to be a corresponding authoritative decision by someone who
represents the agency. There is no evidence of such decision. A more plausible
explanation can be formulated if multilateral agencies are understood as collective
agents (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Weaver 2008; Graham 2013). In that
case, pass-on funds emerge as the product of an interaction between different units.
Each unit faces incentives to perpetuate the implied division of labor — network
units raising funds and managing the programs, and regional units implementing
them. Supportive evidence would need to identify the changing circumstances that
render these funds profitable for both units.
My above discussion suggests that agency-centered explanations for pass-on
funds are a priori more convincing than donor-centered explanations, especially
when considering pass-on funds as the result of individual optimizing decisions of
different units rather than the planned response of the agency leadership. In sum-
mary, my favorite explanation has two parts. The static part uses the functionalist
argument that pass-on funds are an efficient way to divide the labor based on a pro-
cess logic. The dynamic part builds on the public-choice argument that individual
units struggle for their autonomy, and argues that both units faced changes in their
environment that rendered pass-on funds profitable to them.
In the following section, I provide empirical support for my theoretical explana-
tion. Given that the rise of pass-on funds at the World Bank is a singular event,
13
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interviews at World Bank headquarters during summer 2013, with a few follow-up
interviews in 2014.8 Complementary data include documents such as trust fund
program documents, annual budget reports, and evaluation studies.
Web Appendix A includes a quantitative analysis of determinants underlying the
use of pass-on funds, based on a formal bargaining model between a network unit and
a regional unit. The results provide further statistical evidence suggesting that the
struggle for autonomy of individual units (as proxied by their budgets) and external
constraints facing the units are the factors driving the use of pass-on funds. The
statistical analysis supports my claims regarding the incentives underpinning pass-
on funds, but does not generate qualitatively new insights, and therefore appears in
the Web Appendix.
5 Empirical analysis
The evidence presented in this paper draws on the case of the World Bank. Following
an introduction to its institutional structure, the subsequent parts of the analysis
address the research questions of this paper — the rationale for pass-on funds and
factors driving their timing.
5.1 Organizational reforms at the World Bank
The World Bank is a multilateral agency that promotes development mainly through
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the In-
ternational Development Association (IDA). Multilateral policies are broadly de-
termined by the member states, which convene every three years in the Board of
Governors, and on a regular basis in the Board of Executive Directors. The Board
of Executive Directors approves the IBRD/IDA projects as prepared by Bank staff.
The World Bank bureaucracy includes a president (appointed by the member
states) and over 10,000 staff in headquarters and country offices. It has a complex
structure that changed a few times in recent history. A persistent feature of the
World Bank has been the so-called “matrix structure,” existing since 1987. Since
then no institutional reform — not even the latest one in 2014 — touched this
constitutive feature (see Web Appendix B1 for details on organizational reforms at
8 An anonymized list of all 80 interviews is available from the author upon request.
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PQRSTU This simplified structure shows the interaction between one CMU and SMU (and higher
hierarchical levels). Blank areas correspond to headquarters, and gray-shaded areas indicate the
country level. Dotted lines reflect accountability relationships.
the World Bank).
The matrix structure governs the interactions of two functionally specialized
types of units in each of the six regional Vice Presidential Units (VPUs) of the
World Bank (Figure 3). In each regional unit, headed by a regional Vice President,
there are several Country Managing Units (CMUs), headed by country directors,
and Sector Managing Units (SMUs), headed by sector directors. While CMUs are
responsible for the overall country strategy, SMUs cover all technical aspects of
project design for a group of countries.
A matrix structure has the benefit of functional differentiation, where CMUs
develop expertise in convening services and managing portfolios, and SMUs develop
expertise on technical aspects of individual projects. As a result, regional units can
be expected to deliver quality projects also relevant for country needs. A disad-
vantage of the matrix structure is the risk that projects may not fully benefit from
global knowledge at the sector level, because SMUs work in their respective coun-
try departments without sufficient access to sector-specific knowledge at the global
level.
“Network anchors” are sector-wide knowledge hubs detached from individual re-
gions, which collate sector-specific knowledge at the global level. They somewhat
15
aVVWXYaZW [\]^VW_` ]b c`YV]YdaZY]efh ijW k]\Vl naeo YeZ\]lpqWl eWZr]\o aeqj]\`
in its FY 1997 reform (also known as the “Strategic Compact”). Since mid-2014,
following the latest organizational reform, the network anchors no longer exist for-
mally, and the sector-specific global work is carried out by hierarchically organized
network units called “Global Practices.” As the new Global Practices have their own
heads (rather than a Sector Board governing network affairs collectively), network
units are more powerfully represented than regional units in the new structure with
the goal of enhanced Bank-wide learning (Stoiljkovic and Hansen 2014).
None of the most recent institutional changes alters key organizational features
established by the Strategic Compact. One such key feature is the coexistence of
CMUs and SMUs in any given regional unit and the dual accountability of SMUs
to regional and network heads. Moreover, there is continuity with respect to pass-
on funds, which continue to be administered by network units at headquarter level
while being routed through SMUs for implementation.
5.2 The rationale for pass-on funds
The demand side of pass-on funds
Pass-on funds allow regional units (CMUs and SMUs) to expand their activities.
Pass-on funds are very flexible because they can provide program funding to support
recipient-executed activities while also covering expenses for staff activities related
to project preparation, appraisal, and supervision. In the former case, pass-on funds
are similar to IBRD/IDA resources while involving a potentially higher degree of
concessionality to the recipient country. Trust funds are always grants, IDA funding
includes concessional loans and grants, and IBRD loans are non-concessional. By
“sweetening the deal” for recipient countries, trust funds enable CMUs to boost their
lending operations by giving countries the capacity to borrow and easing the terms
of Bank assistance. For example, “[i]n Indonesia, which is reluctant to borrow IBRD
funds for technical assistance, as much as 23% of the trust fund portfolio is dedicated
to such work [...]” (IEG 2011: 36). In addition, thematic funds often provide funding
for global public goods and thereby provide country staff with increased access to
government officials with whom they did not interact beforehand, hence increasing
the potential for new projects. Indeed, pass-on fund grants are “[...] an incentive to
trigger internal actions within countries and also provide the Bank with a way to
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Besides financing recipient-executed activities, pass-on funds are a substitute
for the administrative budget. An important example is the Policy and Human
Resources Development (PHRD) trust fund. Supported by Japan and housed by
the Concessional Finance and Partnerships unit, the trust fund provides resources
to develop lending projects and to enhance their quality. As stated in its annual
report, “[p]roject success can often be related to the [...] solid project preparation,
which would not have been possible without PHRD support” (PHRD 2012: 8).
In one project discussed in the report, “the PHRD grant was instrumental in the
preparation and approval [...] by the World Bank Board of Executive Directors”
(PHRD 2012: 10). The quote demonstrates that an individual project preparation
grant may be valuable, and pass-on funds are more likely to supply these grants
than other trust funds (see Figure 4). When pass-on funds finance analytical work
that at first sight does not seem to be useful for regional units, they may still be
beneficial because those funds are “[...] sometimes fungible when paying for staff
designated to work on the implementation of Bank projects.” If they do so, “there
are pressures to access trust funds for economic and sector work [...] in order to
preserve Bank budget for project appraisal and supervision” (IEG 2011: 75).
The considerable benefits that pass-on funds accrue to regional units may still
not be enough to explain their actual use. Could a regional unit not realize these
benefits by raising its own funds? To be sure, by raising its own funds, a unit can
often well align the fund with its own priorities. However, there are limits as to
which impacts these trust funds can achieve. Own funds in the regional units often
co-finance individual projects, often with the support of a single donor. Apart from
a few single-recipient flagship funds such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF), these regional funds tend to be hardly visible for the larger donor
community and hence do not attract huge amounts of contributions. If a regional
unit decides to raise its own fund, it also faces administrative costs due to the main-
tenance of donor relations and trust fund secretariat services, which may overburden
the capacities especially of the smaller units. Finally, country directors often are
unable to access those donor officials in the donor capitals who make significant
aid budget decisions. Therefore, pass-on funds may be a better option under some
9 Trust funds for global public goods reach new beneficiary countries because these countries
often have no need for development assistance on national public goods, but they supply global
public goods most efficiently (see also, Bagchi, Castro, and Michaelowa 2016).
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that may also be relevant in a given recipient country. Their global scope increases
attention from a larger pool of donors, which implies larger fund sizes. Indeed,
global funds on average are five times larger than country-specific funds, soliciting
contributions of about USD 200 million per fund — this difference is strongly statis-
tically significant (calculations based on World Bank 2013h). This provides the case
for pass-on funds as an additional funding mechanism besides own funds. In addi-
tion, own funds often do not provide (enough) funding for purposes such as project
preparation. Half of all grants from own funds co-finance country operations, while
pass-on funds concentrate most of their grants on technical assistance, followed by
co-financing and project preparation (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Purposes of pass-on funds and own funds in the regional units
§¨©ª«¬
Purposes of trust fund in the regional units by origin of funds – pass-on funds versus own
funds, based on the number of grants between FY 2003-12. Other purposes not shown include
administrative funds, consultancies, debt service, financial intermediation, and other innovative
financing.
Source: World Bank (2013g)
However, pass-on funds are not costless to the regional users, especially to CMUs.
The funds creep into the autonomy of regional units by altering the sector compo-
sition of their country activities. This drawback becomes particularly salient when
the pass-on funds support sector activities that are not a priority for the CMU and
its recipient government. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) states that “[...]
while virtually all of the trust-funded technical assistance and economic and sector
work deals with issues relevant to the country, the work is not always of the highest
priority, would not have been done using the Bank’s budget, and does not always
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“[i]t is staff in those sectors that are crowded out of the CAS [Country Assistance
Strategy] or who do not accept that theirs is not a sector expected to feature active
Bank engagement in the country who then go looking for trust-fund funding (since
this is not made available by the CMU). It is this sort of entrepreneurial activity
that leaves counterparts complaining about studies not relevant to the country and
studies that lie outside donor coordination mechanisms” (IEG 2011: 37). Another
manager asked for an IEG study criticized the Carbon Funds — for causing “[...] a
thousand flowers to bloom,” and that the funds have become “an operational mess,
supporting things that we should not be doing” (IEG 2011: 36). During my own
interviews, one official gave an example of a study intended to advance the knowl-
edge base of a global sector fund, but it turned out that it did not have any concrete
value to the client country.10 The intrusion of pass-on funds into country priorities
clearly is a significant challenge.11
A related concern refers to the potentially adverse quality implications of pass-
on fund activities. Since the funds do not align well with regional units’ priorities,
regional managers tend to neglect quality control. Several interviewees highlighted
this problem. For example, one Operations Officer explained that there is “de-facto
a problem of ownership [...]” and a “higher chance of disconnect and that certain
people are not put in the loops.”12 A regional Trust Fund Coordinator claimed: “In
our unit, all trust fund projects must be approved through the country director [...],
including the funding applications for pass-on funds,” adding that “other regional
units do not necessarily have such rules.”13 My evidence on lack of ownership of
pass-on funds also bears out in the IEG evaluation. According to the evaluators,
supervision quality remains low because the country unit has little ownership in
these funds, arguing that “[...] the smaller funds, especially those managed by the
networks, seem to be ‘off the radar screen’ of the country management unit once
they are approved” (IEG 2011: 61).
A final problem yet unmentioned refers to transaction costs. The same Trust
Fund Coordinator whose unit had strict senior approval rules argued that a task team
leader may submit and application “but does not automatically get the funding,”
10 Interview with Social Development Specialist (August 24, 2014)
11 Sometimes units may still accept pass-on funds for poorly aligned research studies because
some (not all) SMU staff get prestige and psychic benefits from getting published. The testable
empirical implication would be that these staff members should be less sensitive to misalignment.
12 Interview with Operations Officer from a Central Unit (August 12, 2013)
13 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 14, 2013)
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support any operation. This echoes earlier work showing that trust funds increase
internal fundraising costs for World Bank units (Reinsberg 2016).14
The supply side of pass-on funds
Network anchors benefit from pass-on funds for at least two reasons. The first is
that these funds tend to be sizable and therefore generate significant fee income
that a network can use to pursue its priority activities independently from country
demand (World Bank 2007a: 4). If network staff attract funds from donors, they
obtain tangible rewards (such as pay rises and job promotions) from becoming more
operationally relevant and psychic rewards from being operationally relevant and
not just a anchor unit bureaucrat.The second reason is that thematic funds allow
network staff to promote their specific thematic interests, even if a sector is not
of greatest priority to country units. Pass-on funds therefore enable network units
to tilt the portfolios of regional activities toward their own preferred sectors. In
addition, they also involve co-benefits for network units themselves by supporting
their analytical work at the global level.15
While network anchors are motivated to raise pass-on funds, they are also best
placed to solicit large trust funds for global themes from bilateral donors. Donor
officials who are interested in particular sectors do not reach out to the field but
rather to network staff in Bank headquarters. For a donor, making a network anchor
the sole point of contact for a global fund can (1) reduce its transactions costs, and
incidentally the Banks — the minimum size requirement may even force it to provide
one larger TF instead of several region- or country-specific trust funds; (2) use the
network anchors expertise — the donor may trust it to use the funds efficiently more
than it trusts anyone else to; (3) ensure cross-border costs and benefits are taken
into account that CMUs might ignore.16
Network staff at the Bank can thus present themselves as the natural inter-
locutors for donor representatives in donor countries’ capitals. As one Trust Fund
Coordinator from a large network unit explained: “There is a headquarter advan-
tage in terms of capacities and preferences. We are based in D.C. [...] other VPUs
14 In reality, however, CMU staff may still have lower transaction costs from dealing with pass-on
fund staff than external donor staff. I thank Stephen Knack for highlighting this point.
15 Co-benefits are reflected in the Bank-executed funding items within pass-on trust funds and
are quite significant (own calculations, based on World Bank 2013g).
16 I am grateful to Stephen Knack for mentioning these three issues.
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negotiate hard with donors.”17 In their effort to raise new pass-on funds, networks
are most likely to focus on bilateral donors with large global budgets, donors that
share their sector interests, and larger donor countries which tend to have broad
country lists.18
A glance at the contribution data for pass-on funds supports these claims. In
terms of cumulative contributions over FY 2002-13, the four most important donors
of pass-on funds were the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Engagement strategies vary considerably across these donors: The United Kingdom
and the Netherlands also have vast country-specific contributions and hence are
the primary financiers of regional units’ own funds. Their contribution shares to
pass-on funds are below 20%. In contrast, Norway and Spain are most engaged in
pass-on funds as compared to the other donor countries. This squares well with the
common wisdom that these two countries have salient sector interests and thereby
prefer to ally with the network units at the World Bank. For example, Spain created
a “MDG Achievement Fund” at the United Nations to help advance social devel-
opment in 2007. Also, Norway has strong interests in themes like gender equality,
good governance, and human rights.19
In the same way as pass-on funds involve challenges for regional users, they may
also be a risk for the network units which own them. One Program Officer of a
well-established global program stated that “country directors do not look what
is best for the program [...]”20 — implying that they are rather concerned with
aligning trust funds and Country Assistance Strategies. Asked about the most likely
implications of pass-on funds, a Controller argued that these funds could improve
internal cooperation, although communication across departments could sometimes
be burdensome.21
In summary, the analysis thus far lends support to the functionalist argument
that pass-on funds and their underlying division of labor are efficient as they reflect
the respective comparative advantages of each type of unit. Network anchors hosts
the funds as they are better able to access global donor resources, while regional units
have implementing expertise at local levels. This division of tasks along the main
17 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator from a network unit (July 23, 2013)
18 Interview with Senior Operations Officer (August 28, 2013)
19 Interviews with Trust Fund Manager (July 26, 2013), Coordinator (July 26, 2013), and Senior
Program Coordinator (August 19, 2013)
20 Interview with Program Officer (August 9, 2013)
21 Interview with Operations Officer (July 30, 2013)
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the World Bank as a whole, the funds only seem beneficial when they align with
country priorities and hence avoid problems of insufficient ownership on the part of
regional users.
5.3 Organizational reform and the rise of pass-on funds
Organizational reform threatened the autonomy of sector units
Yet to be explored are the particular factors that drove the sudden explosion of pass-
on funds around the millennium. In fact, the adoption of the Strategic Compact
and the rise of pass-on funds are not coincidental. As argued below, the Strategic
Compact can be seen as the single most important explanation for the rise of trust
funds. The adoption of the reform followed a series of setbacks for the World Bank
in its relations with the external environment since the end of the Cold War. In
particular, a key concern was the technical quality of its project work. An inter-
nal evaluation of the matrix structure stated that “technical staff worked primarily
in country department silos and the technical quality of [...] project work dete-
riorated” (World Bank 2012a: 115). In addition, development projects were not
always perceived as relevant for country needs. An influential report accused the
Bank of a “pervasive lending culture” (Wapenhans 1992: 12). The Bank also was
perceived as losing sight of the poor (Smyth 2011: 983) and as sluggish in respond-
ing to new demands from donors, but arguably these demands proliferated after the
end of the Cold War (Weaver 2007: 500). Major donors lost its faith in the Bank
and threatened to withhold contributions unless Bank management implemented
organizational reforms (Thibodeau 1996).
To address these concerns, the World Bank under the leadership of president
James Wolfensohn launched a three-year reform program dubbed the “Strategic
Compact” in 1997. The reform expedited the devolution of country activities to the
field. In addition, it aimed at reinvigorating the organization as a “knowledge bank”
to better reflect the development needs in the globalization era. To achieve the goal
of a knowledge bank and more specifically to facilitate Bank-wide learning, the
reform established so-called “network anchors” and sector boards to link all SMUs
across the Bank and hence make available global knowledge to country teams. In
addition, the reform established dual reporting relationships and country budgets
allocated by CMUs to different SMUs. After the restructuring, it was no longer
possible for SMUs to deploy budget resources without approval by CMUs, which
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operations more closely with country demand (World Bank 2001).
The World Bank itself recognized the significance of this specific feature of the
reform. According to an internal report, “it is this feature, and not the creation of
the networks [...], or decentralization,” that makes the reform “qualitatively different
from those that came earlier” (World Bank 2012a: 116). The transfer of budget
autonomy into the hands of CMUs posed a threat to the autonomy of SMUs. As
one experienced official put it: “Why should CMUs buy expert knowledge from
the SMUs?” — obviously, SMUs remain collectively relevant as providers of sector
expertise, but not an individual SMU whose sector is no longer deemed relevant by a
given CMU. Therefore, according to the official, while the historical division between
CMUs and SMUs is reasonable, it translates into “budget fights.” The consequence
of budget pressure on the SMUs was that SMUs developed additional resources
through trust funds. But this bears the risk of “satellite operations,” activities not
aligned with Country Assistance Strategies, without “the Country Director knowing
about trust fund missions in the country.”22
According to another official, sector staff “were desperately looking for their
sense of being.” As a result, “a pathological trust fund culture emerged, where
TTLs [task team leaders] chased even after ten thousand dollars and labeled this
a great success for their cause.”23 This echoes statements in the IEG evaluation
report that individual staff members were shopping around for trust fund monies,
oftentimes leading to studies that were not considered as relevant for country needs
(IEG 2011: 37).
Network anchors start filling resource gaps for sector units
At the same time as SMUs lost their budget autonomy, their global pendants —
the newly established “network anchors” — started raising large funds for thematic
priorities. These funds provided SMUs with an opportunity to tap new resources
independent of the demand from CMUs. As the funds were formally hosted by
network anchors but passed on to SMUs for local projects, they are called “pass-on
funds.” As a consequence of pass-on funds, the authority of network units (and the
autonomy of SMUs vis-a`-vis CMUs) inside the World Bank increased.
The networks could monetize on the increased donor attention toward social de-
22 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 23, 2013)
23 Interview with Social Development Specialist (August 24, 2014)
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with sector specialists in donor capitals, network staff mobilized “huge buckets of
money.”24 This statement from a Trust Fund Coordinator can be further substanti-
ated by a look at the bilateral aid allocations of the ten largest donors of trust funds.
Without suggesting a one-to-one relationship between the bilateral aid allocations
and trust fund contributions, it is still remarkable that bilateral funding for global
purposes became more abundant since the mid-1990s. In the four years between
1997 and 2000 only, global-purpose aid more than doubled. Thereafter, funding
volumes fluctuated around USD 8 billion. Key donors that expanded their global
allocations around that time were Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and
also the European Commission.25 Suggesting a growing awareness among donors for
global issues, these figures hence illustrate that the network units seized a unique
opportunity to build up their trust-funded chiefdoms for global themes. An internal
report reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that the newly created network anchors
served the growing demand for sector-specific global development expertise, though
this was not at all foreseen at the time the Strategic Compact was conceived (World
Bank 2012a: 119).
Organizational reform created demand for pass-on funds
A number of features in the Strategic Compact also led to incentives for CMUs
to use pass-on funds to support their operations. In fact, CMUs became ever less
resistant against pass-on funds because nearly all features of the reform increased
the pressure on their administrative budgets.
Administrative budgets are indispensable for delivering development projects. In
particular, the administrative budgets covers Bank expenditure related to project
preparation (prior to approval by the Board), and project supervision (once the
projects are activated). Three features of the Strategic Compact squeezed adminis-
trative budgets: increasing safeguard requirements, the evolution of country portfo-
lios toward high-cost environments, and the increasing devolution of country activ-
ities. I discuss each of them in turn.
First, since the mid-1990s, projects involved growing exigencies on safeguards.
As one project manager explained for an IEG review: “I have plenty of examples
of technical specialists that I have not been able to bring on mission [...] because
24 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator from a regional unit (August 2, 2013)
25 For EU aid through trust funds, see also, Michaelowa, Reinsberg, and Schneider (2016)
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and safeguard specialists [...],” while other respondents confirmed that on super-
vision missions “compliance specialists” tend to crowd out sector specialists (IEG
2014: 49). The reason for these elevated requirements was a consequence of a se-
ries of alleged failures since the late 1980s. In 1991, the Bank had to revamp its
environmental safeguards following United States pressure and protests from envi-
ronmentalists in the realm of the Narmada dam project in India (Weaver 2008: 23).
Later, the Bank also revised its social-economic safeguards, responding to criticism
on the alleged failure of “structural adjustment policies” (Danaher 1994; Weaver
2008; Jolly 2014).
Second, regional units also faced higher costs as they engaged in more difficult
country contexts, notably post-conflict states (World Bank 2005b: 35), which need
a lot of technical assistance without offering the immediate prospect of taking up
a loan from the Bank. After the end of the Cold War and the related shift in
donor motives in aid allocation, the World Bank also committed to direct IDA
funding toward poorer clients and to Africa, which “resulted in faster growth of
expenditures” (World Bank 2005b: 38).
Finally, following accusations of a pervasive “lending culture” (Wapenhans 1992:
12), the World Bank reorganized its operations and devolved country operations to
the field. While in FY 1996, not a single country director was located in the field,
already three quarters of the country directors were dislocated to the field in FY
2005 (World Bank 2005b: 34). The built-up of local infrastructure was costly,
which reduced the administrative budget being available for other purposes. In the
spirit of the Paris Declaration, the Bank also sought to increase country owner-
ship through “greater participation in formulating country development assistance
strategies,” which likewise increased costs for the regional units to be covered from
their administrative budgets (World Bank 2005b: 33).
In light of these challenges, regional units were less reluctant than ever before to
turn to pass-on funds in the hope for additional resources. Raising their own trust
funds at the field level was no alternative because such funds primarily co-finance
program activities and thus cannot be used for technical assistance and project
preparation.
In summary, my case study has established the rationale for pass-on funds in
general and related their sudden rise to the organizational reforms of the Strategic
Compact. As argued more generally in an IEG report, “[a]ccording to the vast ma-
jority of those interviewed, budget constraints are [...] perhaps the most important
25
rQRSTU VWX SYRZ [\rS\Q Yr\SY ]\U^S_ `WQX rQ]QrrQ^ YT aYWQ b\^cQY Sd\QQeQfg YWQ
work program ‘increasing tremendously while the Bank budget has remained flat,’
and the risk that their unit ‘would be out of business without trust funds”’ (IEG
2011: 75). Organizational reform and budget pressures are not mutually exclusive
explanations. The reform can be seen as the trigger for the sudden emergence of
pass-on funds, and the effect of the reform worked mainly through its budgetary
implications for the two units involved. For the SMUs, the reform took away their
independent budgets and hence made them seek out new funding opportunities, no-
tably the individual grants from pass-on funds. This partially restored their sense of
being. CMUs were ever less reluctant to accept the intrusion of pass-on funds into
their programs While the regional units were able to expand their work program,
because the reform entailed features that squeezed their own administrative budgets
and hence pass-on funds promised to ease this constraint.
6 Theoretical implications
Given the novelty of pass-on funds and their rapid growth over the past decade,
the primary motivation for this paper is empirical. However, pass-on funds raise
interesting theoretical questions regarding the functional differentiation of interna-
tional bureaucracies and the kinds of incentives facing different bureaucratic actors.
Following previous studies on trust funds, my subsequent discussion focuses on po-
tential lessons within the principal-agent framework.
With respect to the emergent literature on trust funds, my analysis provides a
complementary perspective to most existing studies that focus on the donor per-
spective (e.g., Sridhar and Woods 2013; Graham 2015; Eichenauer and Reinsberg
2017). An exclusive donor perspective may not be fruitful when trying to explain
intra-organizational patterns of authority as implied by pass-on funds. In fact, there
is no clear evidence that pass-on funds directly relate to interests among the prin-
cipals, neither due to a collective desire to gain control over the agent nor due to
preference divergence among the principals.
While the focus on the agent holds much promise, it is further necessary to
disaggregate the agent. To my knowledge, only one study in the principal-agent
framework examines the implications of a fragmented agent on its overall faithfulness
(Graham 2013). Moreover, autonomy is often thought to refer to the principal-agent
relationship. However, struggles for autonomy exist within collective agents. My
case study of pass-on funds shows that different units must cater to different needs
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promote specific themes without necessarily appreciating local circumstances. For
an actor to be autonomous, having an autonomous will is not enough — autonomous
resources are required to pursue autonomous preferences (Cortell and Peterson 2006;
Caughey et al. 2009; Bauer and Ege 2016). As pass-on funds give budget authority
to network units and hence potentially reduce the policy discretion of CMUs, the
decision for CMUs whether to accept pass-on funding is not unconditional. The
tradeoffs of pass-on funds only become clear when considering autonomy between
individual units inside the multilateral bureaucracy rather than autonomy between
the entire bureaucracy and its member states.
My case analysis also echo recent arguments that unfaithful principals rather
than unfaithful agents may be responsible for changes in organizational behavior
(Elsig 2011). The case study has offered some evidence of principal shirking: The
threat of some powerful donors to withhold core contributions was a key motiva-
tion for World Bank president James Wolfensohn to launch the Strategic Compact
(Weaver 2008: 22) that triggered the observed dynamic of pass-on funds through
its implications on administrative budgets. Moreover, there is evidence of principal
drift: The growing demands on the World Bank were not matched with correspond-
ing increases in resources (Linn 1998), leading to growing frustration by donors about
lack of progress (Smyth 2011: 983); this likely expedited the organizational reform.
Finally, there is evidence of principal subversion: Some donors openly challenged
the collective consensus and pushed the Bank into new areas, as evidenced by the
Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program and the activities of the Nordic countries
in the area of human rights (see also, Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015;
Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2016; Reinsberg 2016).
7 Conclusion
Over the past two decades, earmarked funding to international development orga-
nizations has grown massively. The financial mechanism through which external
donors contribute these earmarked resources are so-called trust funds. The World
Bank as possibly the most important trustee organization has a long-standing tra-
dition in the management of trust funds that dates back to the 1960s. Until the
mid-1990s, the prevailing type of trust funds were so-called “own funds,” by which
individual units in the multilateral bureaucracy raised trust funds to support their
own work program.
27
 Ł   Ł  Ł       Ł 
In so-called “pass-on funds,” one unit hosts the trust fund while another unit inside
the organization implements the individual activities under the trust fund. In the
case of the World Bank, this division of labor has taken a characteristic shape: The
so-called “network anchors,” which exist only since an organizational reform in FY
1997, host large funds for global themes, for example fragile states, gender equality,
and climate change, and pass them on for use in the “regional units” and their
individual country offices.
Theoretically, the rise of pass-on funds reflects an interesting setting. The first
question that I address in this paper is why these funds exist at all. Following
organizational theory, my paper shows that this process-driven specialization reflects
the respective comparative advantages of network units to access global funding
sources and the regional units to implement projects on the ground. This is less
trivial than it looks at first sight given that pass-on funds also establish a new
hierarchy that puts regions at a disadvantage. Unlike “own funds,” which match
the priority issues of a unit, “pass-on funds” may lead to misalignment between
global priorities (as promoted by the network anchor) and country-specific needs
(as promoted by the regional unit and particularly the country office) (see also, IEG
2011: viii). As compared to own sources of funding, the regional unit hence faces
a tradeoff between obtaining additional resources and staying relevant to country
needs when deciding whether or not to accept pass-on funding.
A second question pertains to the timing of pass-on funds. Using evidence
from semi-structured interviews at the World Bank and complementary document
sources, I identify the Strategic Compact — a three-year organizational reform that
reorganized budget authority between the relevant units — as the key driver of
pass-on funds. On the one hand, the network units had a particular incentive to
do so since the reform moved budget authority into the hands of country managers
and thereby created pressures to regain budget autonomy among sector staff. At
the same time, bilateral donors increased their funding for global themes, which was
a unique opportunity for the network units to start building their own chiefdoms
supported through these donor monies. On the other hand, regional units became
more desperate for the project preparation budgets provided by pass-on funds as
they saw their own administrative budgets decline as a result of costly devolution,
a higher share of difficult countries in their portfolios, and increasing requirements
on safeguards.
These findings can claim generalizability beyond the period under investigation
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bread-and-butter business of the World Bank — working with recipient countries
and managing projects — operates under a matrix structure that intertwines coun-
try units and sector units and that gives budget authority to the country directors
(World Bank 2012a: 111). In 2014, the World Bank underwent an organization
reform that established Global Practices in an attempt to break the institutional
primacy of the regions and encourage global learning within each sector. However,
the reform did not alter the above matrix structure within each regional unit. Coun-
try directors continue to hold de-facto budget autonomy as their specific demands
determine which sectors feature in country assistance strategies. The key feature
that was created with the introduction of the 1997 reform therefore persists even
under the revised structure. My own interviews suggest that staff do not perceive to
be affected with respect to their incentives vis-a`-vis trust funds. Therefore, the issue
of pass-on funds remains acute, which implies a continued need to balance sector
interests and country needs at the World Bank.
Beyond the World Bank case, my analysis may apply to a broader set of agencies.
Though this paper is about the World Bank, its analysis is relevant beyond this spe-
cific case because the pass-on fund arrangement is common in all major functionally
differentiated international organizations. Such large organizations consists of head-
quarters and field offices, each having different preferences (despite shared goals)
and hence there is a struggle for autonomy and a need for bargaining. For example,
one official from the International Labor Organization (ILO) privately said: “Rain-
makers in the various multilateral agencies actively use the funds [...] to position
themselves and their departments and to build their careers.” There hence seems to
be the risk that trust funds become a strategic device by which individual units seek
to enhance their position within a multilateral agency; actual relevance for recipient-
country needs, project quality, development impact, and cost effectiveness may get
lost on the way. Future research may look into these issues, specifically also in a
United Nations context where pass-on funds formally exist since the establishment
of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office in 2003.26
My study also has potential applicability even beyond intra-organizational in-
26 The similarity of the pass-on funding context at the United Nations indeed is striking. In
its inter-agency pooled funds, donor contributions are not a priori earmarked for a specific im-
plementing agency, and decisions on program allocations are made by an administrator, usually
the United Nations Development Program, “taking into account the programmatic purpose and
results framework of the fund” (UNDG 2015: 4). Implementing agencies face an incentive to obtain
additional resources, even at the risk that proposed activities do not match country priorities.
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requests support from the funds occurs a lot in the multilateral development system,
at least since the rise of so-called “multi-actor funds” (Heimans 2004), for example
the Global Environment Facility, the GAVI Alliance, and the Global Fund to Fight
Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis. These multilateral institutions raise huge amounts
of donor monies while not having own implementation structures. To implement
their programs, these institutions rely on the established international development
organizations, such as the World Bank and other bureaucracies. In these settings,
my analysis can shed light on the conditions under which a given global fund chooses
a specific implementing organization. Prominent research has already been done on
the case of the Global Environment Facility (e.g., Bayer, Marcoux, and Urpelainen
2014), and this paper further contributes to this important strand of research. In
an increasingly complex world plagued by many global problems, the division of la-
bor among different multilateral organizations will further increase and hence these
settings of inter-agency bargaining deserve closer attention.
From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this paper have immediate implica-
tions for the emerging literature on earmarked funding at international development
organizations. Related studies forward donor-centric explanations for the emergence
of earmarked contributions (e.g., Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015; Gra-
ham 2015). In these studies, disagreement among the donors over the substantive
activities of international organizations holds a key to explain earmarking patterns
(e.g., Eichenauer and Hug 2015; Graham 2016; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack
2016).
While these studies have advanced the field in significant ways, this paper pro-
vides a complementary perspective by analyzing the incentives for multilateral agen-
cies to pursue extra-budgetary funding through trust funds. The literature thus far
has explored these incentives only for specific issue areas, for example Carbon Fi-
nance at the World Bank (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011). Most literature often
does not question the unitary-actor assumption on the multilateral bureaucracy.
This overlooks that different units may have different preferences and that they
need independent resources to pursue these preferences. This echoes with public
choice arguments that bureaucrats (here aggregated into cohesive units) have an in-
centive to grow their budgets in order to increase their autonomy. As an important
caveat, however, this autonomy is defined with respect to competing units, not with
respect to the principal, as usual within principal-agent studies.
In a broader view, the paper reinforces arguments about the active role of bu-
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funds can be seen as such an instance of institutional design led by bureaucratic en-
trepreneurs. My work shows that bureaucratic influence on institutional design may
itself be the result of a strategic interaction between organizational units. Hence,
the set of scope conditions under which we see bureaucrats to enter the design stage
may need to be extended to also include factors such as resource competition, the-
matic alignment, and inter-unit trust, in addition to factors that focus more on the
interests of member states.
Within studies of bureaucratic politics and intra-organizational bargaining, more
research could be done to integrate the donors as a strategic actor, without sacrificing
the heterogeneous actor perspective on multilateral agencies. More specifically for
the case of the World Bank, an open issue refers to the rise of own funds as evident
from the descriptive statistics and how it relates to the rise of pass-on funds. This
issue was deliberately left aside in this paper but it would be worthwhile to look
into this at greater detail.
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This web appendix complements the paper by providing a formalization of the bar-
gaining relationship between a host unit and an implementing unit and a statistical
test of its empirical implications. The results are consistent with the interview-based
findings: The factors that were found to underlie the rise of pass-on funds based on
interviews are similar to the ones testable through statistical analysis.
The web appendix entails two parts. The first is a formal model capturing the
bargaining situation between a host unit and an implementing unit. This model
generates predictions that are empirically testable. The second part thus assesses
these predictions using a dyadic dataset of pass-on fund decisions at the World Bank
from the past decade.
A1 A pass-on funds bargaining model
Consider the following model to study the interaction between a network unit (host-
ing the fund) and a regional unit (using the fund). While the model is fitted to
the particular context of intra-organizational bargaining at the World Bank, it is
generally applicable to a wider range of settings, characterized by two units within
an organization whose interests diverge.
Each unit receives ordinary appropriations as a function of long-term predeter-
mined quotas. For example, when the Board of Governors holds its replenishment
meetings for the International Development Association (IDA), donor countries de-
fine the overall resource envelope and the distribution of IDA funds to the regional
units. Arguably, these allocations are exogenous from the perspective of a regional
unit. Moreover, each unit can raise its own extra-budgetary money through trust
funds. In these so-called own funds, each unit raises money to support its ongoing
activities. While own funds can be exactly tailored to client needs, they likely in-
volve administrative costs and human resources related to the maintenance of donor
relations. For the sake of simplicity, assume that own funds are predetermined.
The central tenet of this game hence refers to the cross-unit interaction on pass-
on funds. Each individual grant from a pass-on funds consists of a monetary transfer
(x) and an issue platform (θ). I let x be exogenous in this model, which simplifies
the analysis. However, the substantive focus of a pass-on fund is endogenous and lies
on a single-dimensional continuum (θ ∈ [0,∞[), whose two extremes are a country-
specific platform (θ = 0) and a sector-specific platform (θ → ∞). Both units have
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a “sector-centered platform,” which would involve a strong thematic focus that
emphasizes the global dimension of a problem without considering country-specific
needs. Conversely, the regional unit prefers a “country-centered platform,” which
would require the fund to consider the specific context of the country being assisted
and hence prevent the network unit from learning lessons at the global level.
For the regional unit, both the platform and the resource envelope are payoff-
relevant. The regional unit prefers a country-centered platform, but it may compen-
sate a lack of country-specific alignment of the fund with a higher resource envelope
from the pass-on fund. Hence, there is a fundamental tradeoff for the regional unit
from using pass-on funds. These funds often do not exactly match country needs
but they provide additional resources that translate into new business.
The basic structure of interaction between the units and their payoff schedules
follow the agenda-setting model by Romer and Rosenthal (1978), albeit with sim-
plifying adaptations of the actor space and the parameter space. The timing of the
interaction involves three steps. In the first step, nature determines the parameter
ρ ≥ 0, the substantive focus of an activity that the regional unit will undertake
when no pass-on fund comes into being. For example, ρ may represent the plat-
form achievable through own funds, which may depend on external factors such as
the availability of like-minded donors at the country level. In the second step, the
network unit (N) decides whether (e = 1) or not (e = 0) to enter fundraising for
a pass-on fund, and if it does so, it proposes a “fund platform” (θ ∈ [0,∞[) to the
regional unit. If N does not enter, it will be able to work an additional amount of
time on its own work program that it does not spend on fundraising, which would
yield the additional payoff of b. If N enters, it has to pay a fundraising cost c(θ),
regardless of whether or not unit R accepts. Note that the platform together with
other parameters, for example the availability of bilateral donor funding for specific
sectors, determine the fundraising costs. In the last step, the regional unit (R) ei-
ther accepts (r = 1) or rejects (r = 0) the proposal, leading to either “no fund”
or a pass-on fund. This decision will be informed by the relative attractiveness of
the proposal (θ) given the outside option (ρ). If N had not proposed anything in
the first place, the payoff can arbitrarily be set to zero. If R accepts, it faces the
disutility in terms of platform misalignment but gains an additional amount of grant
resources that becomes more valuable the more R has embraced sector-specific plat-
forms. If R rejects, it simply considers the alignment of the outside option with its
own platform preference.
42
´µ¶¶·¸¹º¹»¼ ½¾¿ ·ÀÁÂ¿ Ã¹ÄÅµÄÄ¹Á»Æ Ç ¾¿»Å¿ ÈÁÄ½µÉ·½¿ ½¾¿ ÊÁÉÉÁË¹»¼ È·ÌÁÍ Êµ»ÅÎ
tions for the two units:
uN(e, θ | r) =


b, if e = 0
θ − c(θ), if e = 1
(1)
uR(r | θ, e = 1) =


−ρ2, if r = 0
(x2 + 2xρ)− (θ − ρ)2, if r = 1
(2)
Note that the utility function of the regional unit incorporates the tradeoff be-
tween additional resources through the pass-on fund and the misalignment with
country priorities by design (though the functional form of the term x2 + 2xρ has
been chosen purely for computational simplification later on).
The game can be solved using backward induction as both players decide se-
quentially under complete information. The last player to move is unit R, deciding
whether or not to accept a given proposal. R accepts under the following condition
(then simplified in the last line):
uR(r = 1 | θ, e = 1) ≥ uR(r = 0 | θ, e = 0) (3)
(x2 + 2xρ)− (θ − ρ)2 ≥ −ρ2 (4)
−(x2 + 2xρ) + θ2 − 2ρθ ≤ 0 (5)
θ ≤ ρ+
√
ρ2 + 2xρ+ x2 (6)
θ ≤ ρ+
√
(ρ+ x)2 (7)
0 ≤ θ ≤ 2ρ+ x (8)
The solution of the participation constraint (condition 8) shows that issue align-
ment and grant funding are substitutes. If the fund provided very little funding
(x→ 0), the highest acceptable platform should not be bigger than twice the plat-
form of the outside option. Conversely, for higher grant amounts, the highest ac-
ceptable platform linearly increases. In the following, denote θR the value that just
satisfies condition 8, hence θR = {θ | θ = 2ρ+ x}.
Anticipating this best response, N optimally wishes to satisfy condition 8, given
that failure to do so leaves it with a lower payoff (note that N must always pay
fundraising costs if it enters the fundraising game). Therefore, N calculates its best
proposal that satisfies condition 8 and then compares the implied utility with the
utility of its outside option, valued at b.
Suppose that N has raised a pass-on fund, then its optimal platform would be
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max
θ|e=1
θ − c(θ) (9)
∂
∂θ
= 1− c′(θ) =! 0 (10)
Without further functional form assumptions, the optimal result is implicit. Let
θN denote the value of θ that just satisfies condition 10, hence θN = {θ | c
′(θ) =
1}. Since N satisfies the participation constraint of R, it follows that N chooses
whichever platform – either θN or θR – is smaller,
θ|e=1 = min{θR, θN} (11)
The last step in solving the model involves calculating the condition under which
N enters the fundraising stage. N perfectly foresees which platform it must choose
(condition 11) after the fundraising stage. For N to be willing to raise a pass-on
fund, the following condition must hold:
uN(e = 1 | θ|e=1, r = 1) ≥ uN(e = 0) (12)
θ|e=1 − c(θ|e=1) ≥ b (13)
Denote as θb the platform at whichN is just indifferent between entering fundrais-
ing and staying out, in which case N raises a pass-on fund and proposes θ|e=1, hence
θb = {θ | b = θ − c(θ)}.
Depending on parameters, two different subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist.
No-fund equilibrium In the first case, N finds its entry costs so high or its
outside option so attractive that it stays out of the game, hence e = 0 and
θ = 0. The best response by R is to reject, r = 0. It is easy to see that no
player can improve its own payoff given the best response of the other player.
Pass-on fund equilibrium In the second case, N finds it beneficial to enter the
fundraising stage. N proposes a platform that R will accept (technically, for
an equilibrium with pass-on fund, both conditions 10 and 8 must be satisfied).
The location of the proposal depends on parameters. If θN > 2ρ+ x, then N
must choose θ∗ = 2ρ+ x in order to respect the participation constraint. This
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change its best response given the strategy of the other player (for N , any
lower platform leaves room for a further utility improvement, but any larger
platform triggers rejection; R does not have an incentive to deviate given
the proposal within the necessary bounds away from 2ρ + x). Alternatively,
imagine 2ρ + x ≥ θN . The equilibrium obtains at θN , and R accepts because
it is better than its own outside option. N also does not have an incentive to
deviate.
In summary, the game has two equilibria, one in which the host does not raise a
fund and the user rejects the proposal, and one in which the host raises a fund and
proposes a fund platform that the user can just accept. Equilibrium choice hinges on
exogenous parameters. For example, if the host is unable to make any proposal that
would satisfy the participation constraint of the user, then the host does not make
any proposal. In that case, N would be left with its own work program, supported
through Bank budget and Bank-executed trust funds, whereas R would be left with
IBRD/IDA projects and own funds.
Comparative statics can be derived once I parametrize the cost function and the
outside option. For instance, assume that fundraising costs are c(θ, h, d) and hence
are a function that depends on the chosen platform (θ), trust fund regulation (h),
and donor availability (d). Similarly, I assume that the relative value of the outside
option can be captured in a function ρ(g, t) which depends on the grant composition
of these resources (g), and the level of trust in the host unit (t). This leads to a
number of testable hypotheses presented in the following.
First and foremost, anecdotal evidence suggests that budget constraints are the
most important reason as to why individual units pursue trust funds. For almost all
trust funds, the host unit deducts a small fee for secretariat services from the donor
contributions and thereby increases its own administrative budget.27 This implies
that network units may perceive pass-on funds as a useful strategy to fill gaps in
their own budget especially when the latter has depleted. The first hypothesis hence
reads as follows:
Bank budget hypothesis An decrease in b makes entry into fundraising more
27 For a few cases, the World Bank agreed with the donors to waive the fee, notably in the case
of debt relief trust funds. These funds are administratively easy to handle and there was agreement
that the resources should benefit the recipient to the fullest extent possible (World Bank 2012b:
17).
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thing else equal.
In recent years, the World Bank leadership has tightened its control on trust
funds, enacting a number of reforms to discourage further fundraising. A watershed
reform was the so-called “Trust Fund Management Framework,” approved by the
Executive Board in FY 2007. Before the reform, for example, network units could
have a parallel dialogue in a recipient country besides the country unit. After the
reform, such an activity would need approval by the respective country director.28.
Bank management also increased the minimum threshold for donor contributions
to create a new fund.29 Besides raising the minimum threshold from USD 200,000
to USD 1 million, the reform also introduced a start-up fee of USD 35,000 and
augmented the fees for some types of trust funds (World Bank 2007b: v). In essence,
the trust fund reforms most likely increased the costs for fundraisers inside the Bank.
Host regulation hypothesis Regulation h is a cost parameter (note from above
that c depends on multiple factors, i.e., c(θ, h, d, ...) such that ∂
∂h
> 0. An
increase in h negatively affects entry into fundraising and hence the probability
of pass-on funding, everything else equal.
The potential resource base from which network units can solicit new funds
should directly impact the number of pass-on funds. Since the Millennium Declara-
tion (UN 2000), awareness among donors for development challenges with a global
scope has been rising. Prior to that, the concept of “Global Public Goods” as cham-
pioned in an influential paper commissioned by the United Nations Development
Program paved the way for a renewed attention on global problems (Kaul, Grun-
berg, and Stern 1999). Many bilateral donors reoriented their aid budgets toward
global activities. At the same time, individual donors also pushed their thematic pri-
orities in the newly established working groups of the Donor Assistance Committee
(DAC) at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Established at an increasing rate since the early 2000s, these informal groups discuss
global development issues and thereby help raise awareness for specific themes and
disseminate best practices among the donors. An increasing availability of global
funding and an increasing awareness of global development themes hence should
ease the constraints on the network units to establish pass-on funds.
28 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator (August 2, 2013)
29 Interview with Director (August 9, 2013)
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(in the above notation, ∂c
∂d
< 0); hence, if it is easier to obtain funding from
external donors, the probability of pass-on funding increases, everything else
equal.
The above hypotheses include factors that affect the cost-benefit calculus of a
network unit in its decision whether or not to engage in fundraising. Similarly, the
regional units face exogenous conditions that affect the way in which they resolve
the postulated tradeoff between misalignment between the fund platform and their
own needs and the additional resource envelope made available by the pass-on fund.
First and foremost, the outside options of a regional unit affect its willingness to
accept a proposal. In particular, I am concerned with the non-monetary component
of these outside options, and I consider two exogenous conditions as being important
in that regard.
Since trust funds essentially provide grant funding to recipient countries, they
may be particularly valuable for regional units whose client countries are ineligi-
ble for grant funding. In particular, beneficiary countries with medium levels of
per-capita income are restricted to borrow at non-concessional rates while being
excluded from concessional resources. In cases in which the country does not want
to borrow, it also does not benefit from the technical expertise of World Bank staff
that usually comes along with a loan. A trust fund may provide the country with
precious expertise through a donor-supported grant. This is attractive not only for
the recipient country but also for the respective unit because the grant may promote
future lending.30 My next hypothesis hence reads as follows:
Grant funding hypothesis An increase in the share of IBRD-only countries g in
the portfolio of unit R represents a weaker outside option, corresponding to a
higher value of ρ(g, t). Everything else equal, this leads to a higher probability
of pass-on funding.
In addition, pass-on funding opportunities are often about the relationships of
individual people inside a multilateral bureaucracy. Therefore, the level of trust
between host unit and implementing unit should have a positive relationship on the
collaboration through pass-on funds.
30 There are numerous cases in which a trust fund supporting technical assistance has led to a
subsequent Bank loan. For a long time, this was the stated aim of the Policy and Human Resource
Development (PHRD) program supported by a Japanese trust fund (PHRD 2012).
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ized by preexisting similarities in terms of substantive focus. This should
reduce the cost of fundraising (for example, since N has lower uncertainty
regarding its funds not remaining idle), and R would be more willing to ac-
cept a proposal from this unit than any other unit. Any such interpretation is
consistent with a positive effect of mutual trust on the probability of pass-on
funding.
In principle, there also is a hypothesis on the (exogenous) amount of grant fund-
ing that R can obtain from N through the pass-on fund. Theoretically, a higher
amount of funding should positively relate to a higher probability of pass-on funding.
I refrain from testing this relationship though, because a higher number of pass-on
funds should also explain the pass-on fund amount – hence, there is simultaneity.
Inclusion of the variable “Pass-on fund amount” in a variety of lagged specifications
does not alter the coefficients of interest, with the exception of “Global funding,”
with which it is positively correlated and hence global funding turns insignificant.
A2 Empirical analysis
This section includes the empirical analysis, proceeding with a brief description of
the data and the operationalization of the variables of interest to test the hypotheses.
After having discussed estimation methods, I present the main results along with a
set of robustness tests.
A2.1 Data
I use a dataset of all activities supported from pass-on funds from FY 2002-13
(World Bank 2013g). The unit of analysis is the dyad-year observation, where a
dyad consists of a network unit serving as host of fund and a regional unit as fund
user. As discussed earlier, the reverse case of the regional unit being a host and the
network unit being a user is irrelevant and hence all dyads with that division of labor
are excluded. The dependent variable is the number of pass-on funds hosted by a
given network unit and implemented by a given regional unit in a fiscal year. While
funding volumes could also be considered, I prefer the number of funds in order to
account for the many different purposes of pass-on funds that have different average
funding requirements. The number of funds essentially reflects the degree of success
of inter-organizational bargaining.
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of Bank budget of a given network unit to test the first hypothesis. I logarithmize
this variable to remove skewness and use a one-year lag in order to not lose too
many observations as Bank budget figures are publicly available only since 2001.
I construct the Bank budget variable from the budget reports of the World Bank
(e.g., World Bank 2014).
Second, to capture pass-on funding regulation, I calculate a time-varying measure
of regulation that captures the extent to which a network unit would be affected by
the Trust Fund Management Framework (TFMF). I compute an index of regulatory
pressure facing the host unit in three important areas of trust fund regulation.31 As
only one such area, consider for example the setup fee. If a unit previously raised
funds without charging donors a setup fee as it was introduced with the TFMF
reform, the unit would score high in this area. The basis for computation represents
all the trust funds created by the network unit in the past three years. High values
on the regulation index reflect high regulatory pressure and painful adjustments
in the post-TFMF period.32 Note that I cannot simply include a binary indicator
for the years after the TFMF reform because its effect cannot be identified in the
presence of year effects. Dropping the year effects is not an option because I want
to account for global shocks affecting the outcome of interest.
Third, as discussed in the hypothesis section, there are two measures to capture
the availability of thematic funding from bilateral donors. The first one considers
the logged amount of bilateral aid available for global purposes, drawn from the
Creditor Reporting System (OECD 2013). This measure requires the assumption
that the bilateral aid allocations of donor countries are positively related to their
willingness to support pass-on funds at the World Bank. This is realistic because
trust funds are covered by the bilateral aid budget in most donor countries and
almost all pass-on funds operate on a global scale. The second measure considers
the number of donors that chair an OECD/DAC working group. As these groups
discuss global development issues such as poverty reduction, gender equality, and
climate change, it can be plausibly assumed that increased attention for such topics
should relate to a higher amount of financial resources potentially available to pass-
on funds. Both measures cannot be used simultaneously as they vary over the same
31 For more information on the reform process, see World Bank (2013c-e).
32 The precise calculation of the index involved averaging over the shares of three types of trust
funds that would be affected by the TFMF reform. The shares were mean-variance standardized
(see the Appendix for a complete description).
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For example, an alternative could be the relative weight of specific sectors in the
bilateral aid allocation.33 This measure would be problematic due to its assumption
that a reshuﬄing in the bilateral aid budget toward a specific sector does benefit
the network unit at the World Bank. The measure also escapes straightforward
operationalization because the OECD/DAC donors and the World Bank have dif-
ferent sector definitions and hence the sector mappings between them are prone to
measurement error. Another alternative measure of sector-specific salience, notably
the number of donors that chair an OECD/DAC working group in the sector(s)
featuring in the work program of the network unit, suffers at least from the problem
of correctly matching OECD/DAC sectors into World Bank sectors (see the Ap-
pendix for variable definitions). Results that use these latter two measures should
be interpreted with a grain of salt.
Fourth, a key concept on the demand side for pass-on funds reflects the outside
options of the regional unit. The program budget of a regional unit captures these
outside options. The program budget consists of IBRD/IDA projects and own funds
raised by the regional unit itself. To mitigate the impact of outliers and to capture
the idea of economies of scale, I take the logarithm of the IBRD/IDA project size for
all projects of a unit approved by Executive Board in the past three years (World
Bank 2013i). Moreover, I include the logged amount of own funds (own calculations,
based on World Bank 2013g).34
Fifth, the grant-funding hypothesis states that regional units with a higher share
of countries that are ineligible for concessional funding through conventional sources
are more likely to rely on pass-on funds. I therefore include the percentage of the
project volume provided as IBRD loans (rather than IDA commitments) imple-
mented by the unit in the past three years (World Bank 2013i).
Sixth, I require a measure of mutual trust between the two units. Each IBRD/IDA
project is assigned a Sector Board, which is in charge of aligning sector programs
with country-specific needs. Therefore, a higher percentage of projects through a
Sector Board indicates prior interaction between the two units and hence an oppor-
tunity to build trust and mutual understanding about joint priorities. I assume that
33 Other papers have taken a similar approach, for example by comparing sector allocations of
international organizations and their member states (Schneider and Tobin 2016) and by calculating
a coefficient of variation in sector shares among donors (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack 2016).
34 A more precise measure of program resources from own funds only involves the co-financing
trust funds of the regional unit. This measure may be used for robustness tests.
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tion in the future. Therefore, I use the percentage of IBRD/IDA projects of the
regional unit over the past three years passing the Sector Boards administered by a
given network unit (World Bank 2013i) as a proxy of inter-unit trust.
A2.2 Methods
While theoretically a host unit may decide not to raise pass-on funds at all and
an implementing unit may decide not to accept any proposed funds at all, these
instances are rare in the dataset. Only 15% of all dyad-year observations involve no
pass-on funds. As I have no reason to expect these observations to be driven by a
different mechanism than the observations with a positive number of pass-on funds,
I conduct a unified panel analysis with the number of pass-on funds for each possible
host-user dyad as the dependent variable. As the dependent variable involves count
data, I estimate a Poisson model, using Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood with
fixed effects on both dyads and years (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011). I also allow
for arbitrary correlations in the errors by computing a robust variance-covariance
matrix clustered for dyads (Simcoe 2008).35
The econometric model reads as
E(yijt | Xijt, αij, φt) = exp(Xijtβ + αij + φt) (14)
whereby β contains the parameter estimates, αij represents the fixed effect on dyad
(i, j), and φt captures global shocks to the number of pass-on funds. The inclusion
of two-way fixed effects mitigates potential bias due to omitted variables.
As regards further control variables, I include the logged amount of program
funding from alternative sources of the regional unit. It is likely that a large amount
of IBRD/IDA resources may affect both Bank budgets and the number of pass-
on funds. To avoid spurious correlation, this variable should be included. In a
robustness check, I also include a regional unit’s own funds for the same reason.36
35 While clustering for host units would be a conceptually attractive option, it is not an em-
pirically feasible one due to the low number of host units and the reliance on asymptotics of the
cluster-robust standard errors.
36 Further control variables could be included, which would not alter the coefficients of interest
though.
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Table A1 presents the main results. Column 1 only includes the predictors relating
to host-unit hypotheses. All predictors have the predicted sign and are statisti-
cally significant. Column 2 includes the predictors relating to the users of pass-on
funds. Except for the IBRD/IDA program funding, whose coefficient cannot be dis-
tinguished from zero, all indicators turn out as expected. Column 3 combines both
sets of covariates, which does not change their respective signs as compared to when
they were included separately.
Consider the predictions based on column 3 for a few cases. For example, when
all variables are held at their respective means, the average number of pass-on funds
being created amounts to 6.0. If then the host-unit Bank budget declines by 33%,
the unit raises about 6.4 funds, an increase by about 7%. Alternatively, if host-unit
regulation had increased by one standard deviation, the number of pass-on funds
would have reduced to 5.7. Conversely, an increase in aid for global purposes from
donor countries by 10% would lead to an increase in the number of pass-on funds to
6.3 funds. If the implementing unit had a higher percentage of IBRD-only countries
by one standard deviation, the predicted number of pass-on funds would be 6.4
funds. Finally, an improvement in mutual trust as reflected in the history of joint
IBRD/IDA projects by one standard deviation relates to additional pass-on funding
of about 0.1 funds. Goodness-of-fit measures represent the pseudo-R2, calculated
as the relative improvement in the likelihood from a baseline model with only the
two-way fixed effects.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses shown in the previ-
ous section. To probe the robustness of these results, the next section conducts a
sensitivity analysis based on different variable definitions.
Table A2 presents some robustness checks. Column 1 replaces Log(Global aid)
with the number of chairs in the OECD/DAC working groups. It turns out that
this measure proxies funding for global purposes equally well as the money amount
itself, given its strongly significant coefficient. Column 2 replaces Log(Global aid)
by its underlying change in absolute dollar amounts from year to year. The analysis
indicates that pass-on funding seems to increase after an increase in global-purpose
aid. The next two columns again use Log(Global aid) but add measures of salience
for the specific sector(s) in which the network unit has its stakes.
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(1) (2) (3)
Log(Bank budget) -0.809*** -0.832***
(0.170) (0.163)
Host regulation -0.528*** -0.563***
(0.181) (0.128)
Log(Global aid) 1.088*** 0.671***
(0.241) (0.237)
Percentage of IBRD countries 0.010* 0.010**
(0.006) (0.004)
Mutual trust 0.013** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.005)
Log(IBRD/IDA budget) 0.173 0.154*
(0.108) (0.083)
N 498 576 498
McFadden-R2 0.13 0.03 0.16
p-values: * .1 ** .05 *** .01
Notes: Two-way fixed effects for host-user dyads and individual years included. Dyad-clustered
standard errors shown in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Bank budget) -0.832*** -0.832*** -0.781*** -0.726*** -0.665*** -1.238***
(0.163) (0.163) (0.153) (0.137) (0.135) (0.309)
Log(Bank budget) × Network involvement 0.017*
(0.010)
Host regulation -0.563*** -0.563*** -0.592*** -0.643*** -0.743*** -0.553***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.153) (0.153) (0.141) (0.130)
Global aida 0.130*** 0.030*** 0.614** 0.473* 0.102** 0.640***
(0.043) (0.008) (0.254) (0.260) (0.050) (0.238)
Sector salienceb 0.008 0.051***
(0.010) (0.012)
Percentage of IBRD countries 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.006* 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mutual trust 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Log(IBRD/IDA budget) 0.154* 0.154* 0.151* 0.151* 0.207* 0.153*
(0.083) (0.083) (0.080) (0.078) (0.113) (0.083)
Number of own funds 0.007
(0.004)
Log(Total size of own funds) -0.015***
(0.005)
N 498 498 498 498 456 498
McFadden-R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.16
p-values: * .1 ** .05 *** .01
Notes: Two-way fixed effects for host-user dyads and individual years included. Dyad-clustered standard errors
shown in parentheses.
a) Different measures used for sensitivity checks, notably Log(Global aid) (columns 3, 4, and 6), the change in
global aid (column 2), the number of chairs in DAC working groups (column 1 and 5).
b) Different measures used for sensitivity checks, notably the average percentage of the sector(s) in bilateral aid
featuring in a network unit’s work program (column 3) and the number of chairs in DAC working groups relevant
for the network unit’s sector(s) (column 4).
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bilateral aid portfolios (column 4), there indeed is a positive effect of the number of
donors that chair a DAC working group in the specific sector(s) being relevant to
the network unit.37 Column 5 adds alternative sources of program budget for the
regional unit, notably the dollar value of own funds as well as its overall number.
It turns out that conditional on the number of own funds, their dollar value has a
negative relationship with pass-on funds. This suggests that the bigger the projects
that a regional unit can implement through its own funds, the less it needs to draw
on pass-on funding.38
Finally, in column 6, the set of hosts is divided into units whose services feature
prominently in IBRD/IDA projects and those that do not. This allows for a more
narrow test of the key quote in the IEG report according to which especially the
network units that were crowded out of the country programs should have most
incentives to pursue trust funds. For this purpose, I include an interaction between
the host-unit Bank budget and the importance of a unit in core-funded projects over
the past three years. As expected, the Bank budget has a less negative relationship
with pass-on funds for units with a prominent role in core projects.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses put forward in the previ-
ous section. First and foremost, budget constraints are an important driver of trust
funds. Especially the decline in the Bank budget jeopardized the perceived security
of the network units, which hence turned to trust funds as a supplementary source
of income. However, the regional units do not rely on trust funds to prop up their
program budget. In fact, the weakly positive association between their IBRD/IDA
resources and the number of pass-on funds even suggests a complementarity between
pass-on funds and IBRD/IDA projects in that these trust funds support related ac-
tivities that are critical for the success of core-funded projects. Further support
for this claim comes from the consistent positive effect of the importance of loans
relative to grant funding: The more countries are eligible only for non-concessional
loans, the higher the incentive for a regional unit to draw on a trust fund in order
to bring in some grant funding. This stresses the importance of trust funds for the
overall business of the World Bank.
Of course, the empirical results are merely correlational. However, I have sought
37 These results also hold if the global aid budget was replaced by the total number of DAC
chairs (as used in column 1).
38 When including the latter two indicators separately, none of them is significant.
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and lagging the predictors of interest. In addition, some qualitative evidence may
help exclude the possibility of reverse causation. A key variable in my regressions
represents the host-unit Bank budget, whose negative coefficient estimate could
generally be interpreted in two ways.
One interpretation is that network units raised trust funds in response to a flat
budget. There is abundant evidence in favor of this interpretation. One senior
official in the Concessional Finance and Partnerships unit argued that “trust funds
substitute for the Bank budget that we do not have,” explaining that the Executive
Board “has not increased the administrative budget since 2007.”39 An Executive
Director admitted that “there is a link between the flat Bank budget and trust
funds.”40
Another potential interpretation would be that network units incur costs from
increased fundraising for pass-on funds that their administrative budgets must cover.
In fact, the earlier budget reports of the Bank raise doubts about the financial
sustainability of trust funds and their insufficient cost recovery. As early as in FY
2004, the Bank introduced a “standardized cost recovery policy for trust funds”
(World Bank 2003: 23), and it further increased trust fund managing fees in the
Trust Fund Management Framework (World Bank 2007b). It therefore seems highly
unlikely that trust funds could have a tangible impact on the Bank budget.
A4 Data description
Pass-on funds (dependent variable) Count of the number of trust fund grants
hosted by a network VPU and implemented by a regional VPU in a given year
from FY 2002 to FY 2013. At the grant level, there is no ambiguity as to who
are the relevant VPUs in the host-user dyad.
Source: World Bank (2013g)
Log(Bank budget) Logarithm of the host unit’s Bank budget, lagged by one year
and deflated to 2012 constant million USD.
Source: World Bank (2014)
Host regulation Annual index of potential affectedness by trust fund regulation
39 Interview with Lead Operations Officer (August 26, 2013)
40 Interview with Adviser from a mid-sized donor (August 27, 2013)
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a affected by the Trust Fund Management Framework (TFMF); the index
has three components, which reflect the respective percentages of trust funds
raised by the network unit over the past three years that would be affected
by the following regulatory items: (1) Percentage of trust funds that do not
(yet) charge a setup fee; (2) percentage of trust funds that are likely to be
(too) small, notably Bank-executed trust funds or single-donor trust funds;
(3) percentage of trust funds whose fee structures are prone to cost under-
recovery, notably co-financing funds, reduced-fee trust funds, and rate-cost
recovery trust funds; these percentages are mean-variance standardized and
aggregated into an index; higher values indicate higher potential affectedness
by TFMF regulation
Source: World Bank (2013g)
Log(Global aid) Logarithm of total funding from bilateral donors available for
global purposes (recipientcode=998)
Source: Creditor Reporting System (OECD/DAC 2013)
Change in global aid Absolute dollar amount change from year to year in the
total volume of global aid (see the definition above)
Source: Creditor Reporting System (OECD 2013)
Number of DAC working groups Number of donor countries that chair an
OECD/DAC working group in a given year
Source: Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack (2016)
Sector salience in bilateral aid Average percentage of a sector in the bilateral
aid allocations of all OECD/DAC donor countries; Only those sectors are
considered that are potentially relevant for the given network unit (sector
matching available upon request)
Source: Creditor Reporting System (OECD 2013)
Sector salience in DAC working groups Number of donor countries that chair
an OECD/DAC working group in the sector(s) potentially relevant for the
given network unit in a given year
Source: Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Knack (2016)
Percentage of IBRD countries Percentage of IBRD countries in the IBRD/IDA
projects of the implementing unit over the past three years
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åæçèce: World Bank (2013i)
Mutual trust Percentage of IBRD/IDA projects of the regional unit over the past
three years passing the Sector Boards administered by a given network unit.
Each IBRD/IDA project is assigned to only one Sector Board, which is in
charge of aligning sector programs with country-specific needs.
Source: World Bank (2013i)
Log(IBRD/IDA budget) Logarithm of the total size of IBRD/IDA projects
(Lending project cost) activated by the regional unit over the past three years
Source: World Bank (2013i)
Number of own funds Number of “own funds” raised by a regional unit in a
given year; own funds are trust funds whose grants are used by the host unit
itself
Source: World Bank (2013g)
Log(Total size of own funds) Logarithm of total grant volume allocated by all
“own funds” of a regional unit in a given year (see the above definition of own
funds)
Source: World Bank (2013g)
Network involvement Percentage of IBRD/IDA projects across the World Bank
over the past three years that went through the Sector Board associated to a
given network unit
Source: World Bank (2013i)
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Obs Mean Sd Min Max
Pass-on funds 576 27.38 49.17 0.00 436.00
Log(Bank budget) 504 45.01 15.17 23.80 81.40
Host regulation 570 -0.12 0.68 -1.83 1.51
Log(Global aid) 576 23.58 0.40 23.00 24.11
Change in global aid (1e+6) 576 1.59 3.28 -3.04 8.90
Number of DAC working groups 576 7.42 1.89 4.00 10.00
Sector salience in bilateral aid 576 21.28 12.89 3.22 43.04
Number of DAC working groups 576 3.11 2.47 0.00 9.00
Percentage of IBRD countries 576 68.20 33.30 0.24 98.63
Mutual trust 576 12.50 17.51 0.00 75.63
Log(IBRD/IDA budget) 576 24.45 0.63 22.82 25.62
Number of own funds 528 14.61 11.08 0.00 51.00
Log(Total size of own funds) 528 17.40 4.19 0.00 22.35
Network involvement 576 12.48 13.50 0.00 36.38
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B1 Organizational reforms at the World Bank
The World Bank restructured its internal functioning several times in history. Four
phases relating to distinct organizational structures can be distinguished. In all
phases, however, there has been a tension between regional VPUs and network
VPUs.41
Pre-1987
The World Bank started out as a rather small organization. It managed a limited
number of projects, and most of these projects were centrally managed. A lenient
organizational structure hence was useful to strike a balance between functional
differentiation and overall cost effectiveness. Management arrangements were hi-
erarchical: Staff members and middle managers reported directly to a single line
supervisor. Following the expansion of the Bank in the McNamara era, projects be-
came increasingly regional. Therefore, the regional vice president increasingly had
to play the role of a mediator between country-specific groups and sector groups.
1987
In 1987, former World Bank president Barber Conable further increased the func-
tional differentiation of the two types of units to govern their relationship and to
reduce the perceived lack of country orientation. The reform made CMUs respon-
sible for the overall country strategy, while SMUs covered all technical aspects of
project design for a relevant group of countries. This reform did not prove to be
successful in all regards: “While [it] strengthened the country focus, technical staff
worked primarily in country department silos and the technical quality of [...] project
work deteriorated.”
1997
As tensions between CMUs and SMUs continued and the country focus still had
room for improvement, the World Bank launched a new reform dubbed “Strategic
Compact” under the leadership of James Wolfensohn. Key aspects of the reform
41 This section is based on World Bank 2012a (pp.113-119). I also benefited from exchange with
a few staff members at the World Bank.
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dialogue, and the establishment of the network anchors (and Sector Boards) to link
all SMUs across the Bank and hence make available global knowledge to country
teams. In addition, the reform established dual reporting relationships and coun-
try budgets allocated by CMUs to different SMUs. It is this feature, “and not the
creation of the networks [...], or decentralization,” that makes the reform “qualita-
tively different from those that came earlier.” After 1997, it was no longer possible
for SMUs to deploy budget resources without approval by CMUs, which sought to
reduce “supply-driven behavior” by SMUs. Laying budget authority in the hands
of CMUs should align Bank operations closer to country demand.
Though not anticipated, the reform proved to be critical to the revival of World
Bank operations in the realm of the Millennium Development Goals — adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in autumn 2000. The newly created network
anchors served the growing demand for sector-specific global development expertise.
Hence, in addition to their internal dissemination role, they were the outside face of
the Bank on issues relating to their sectors. Consequently, the World Bank became
a privileged partner on global public goods and cross-country challenges, although it
was thought to be passive in response to external demands and lacked clear internal
guidance.
2014
Under the leadership of Jim Kim, the World Bank adopted an organizational reform
that became effective on July 1, 2014. Maintaining the double matrix, the reform
reorganized the relationship between former regions and former networks (called
“Global Practices” to emphasize the potential for cross-fertilization among sector
units in different regions). The network anchors were abolished and replaced by
heads of global practices. The regional vice presidents were essentially relegated
(as indicated by the dashed line running to the heads of Global Practices in the
figure below): Primary accountability of SMU staff — relevant for salary increases
and job promotions — is now to the Global Practice heads and not the regional
Vice Presidents. In addition, the reform established “Cross-Cutting Solution Areas”
whose function is to mainstream key development themes into Bank projects. The
reform did not affect the operational matrix that supports the country operations
and which consists of CMUs and SMUs. This is easily seen by comparing the former
sectors with the new global practices (see Table B1) and by juxtaposing the before-
61
Fﬁﬂﬃ !"# $%&' !()* %ﬂ()ﬁ+(,ﬁ%)(& -,ﬃ.,ﬃ / 0% ()' (0,  ,1 23"4  0%5
(0,  %ﬂ()ﬁ+(,ﬁ%)(& -)(a-1%,- 6Fﬁﬂﬃ !"78
The organizational reform did not touch the regional matrix that governs the
country-related operations of the Bank. In particular, there continues to be a dual
line of accountability for sector teams working in specific countries. Additional in-
formal staff interviews (conducted in 2016) confirm the impression that the reform
did not have any significant consequences on operational teams (i.e., budget ac-
countability and ability to charge time to projects have not changed). The fact that
operational procedures changed little is also reflected in the continuity of the budget.
The new budget (as reported on from FY 2015 onward) appears to be incommen-
surate with the old budget (as reported until FY 2014). Under the old structure,
regional units and network anchors have separate budget lines in the program bud-
get. The new structure does not feature individual line items for network VPUs or
regional VPUs, but a country envelope – including all project-related work, knowl-
edge services, and convening services – and a global envelope, which encompasses all
activities without a specific client country (see World Bank 2015: 15). It is striking
that this way of reporting carries forward the old accounting, albeit at a higher level
of aggregation that limits empirical analysis for years after FY 2014. In fact, what
now appears as global envelope essentially is the sum of program expenses of the
former network anchors. The country envelope is the sum of the former regional
VPUs. Even the allocation process is the same: The budget is notionally allocated
to the regional VPUs, which then agree on a work program with the Global Practices
(World Bank 2015: 15).
Ironically, for the donors, it might have become harder to identify the right sector
counterparts in some Global Practices. This is because some Global Practices do
not have recognizable anchor units.
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Old structure (until FY 2014) New structure (since FY 2015)
Sustainable Development Network Global Practices
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry Agriculture
Energy and Mining Energy and Extractives
Transportation Environment and Natural Resources
Information and Communications Transport and ICT
Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection Water
Industry and Trade Social, Urban, Rural, and Resilience
Human Development Network
Education Education
Health and other Social Services Health, Nutrition, and Population
Social Protection Social Protection and Labor
Labor Markets and Jobs
Other networks
Public Administration, Law, and Justice Macroeconomic and Fiscal Management
Poverty Poverty
Finance Finance and Markets
Governance
Notes: There are three sets of Global Practices (as grouped in the table), each reporting to their
own director (devex 2015). In addition to the Global Practices, there are four “Cross-cutting
solution areas,” including Climate Change; Fragility, Conflict, and Violence; Gender; Jobs; and
Public-Private Partnerships.
Sources: Own illustration based on World Bank (2012a); World Bank (2016); devex (2015)
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Since the beginning of trust funds, own funds have been the typical arrangement
between an individual donor and its multilateral implementing agency. In the 1980s,
many donors established consultant trust funds that financed staff secondments from
national development agencies to the World Bank. In the 1990s, despite further evo-
lution of trust fund purposes, both types of units relied on trust fund to support
their respective activities. Regional units increased their efforts to solicit grant-
funding opportunities for recipient countries, leading to an increase in the number
of country-specific trust funds (Figure B2). The main beneficiaries of trust funds
initiated during that period were Vietnam, Bangladesh, West Bank and Gaza, Pak-
istan, Indonesia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (World Bank 2013h). In 1998, the
Netherlands started the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP) to support
pilot studies in a number of high-salience sectors, for example fragile states, gender
equality, and reproductive health (BNPP 2013: 2). All these initiatives led to trust
funds in support of specific sectors and hence involved the network units as main
beneficiaries of the funds. Despite the different purposes of trust funds in regional
units and network units, the trust funds created until FY 2000 had in common that
they were raised and implemented by the same unit. They can thus be called “own
funds.”
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~ Thick lines show the total number of own funds being active in a fiscal year net of terminated
funds by unit type. Individual dots of the corresponding color show the unit-specific data. Trust
funds of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are excluded.
Source: World Bank (2013h)
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Another way of looking at the phenomenon of pass-on funds involves an analysis of
“which units host funds” and “which units implement projects supported by funds.”
In general, each individual unit can be involved in trust funds in only three distinct
ways. Either the unit hosts the trust fund and allocates the fund to its own work
program (labeled “Host and user” in the figure), or the unit hosts a trust fund
passing on its resources for implementation to another department (labeled “Host
but not user”), or the unit uses a fund that it does not host itself (labeled “User
but not host”).
Using the World Bank trust fund databases, I detect considerable variation in
these three possible roles in the analysis of inter-unit trust fund grants from 2002
to 2013. The largest difference in host-user patterns holds between regional units
and network units. Figure B3 shows that regional units primarily are receivers of
grants from trust funds established elsewhere in the Bank (yellow bars). In contrast,
regional units almost never raise trust funds intended for implementation by other
World Bank units (red bars). A moderate share of trust funds comes from own
fundraising (blue bars). In contrast, network units to a large extent serve as hosts
of trust funds that allocate trust fund grants to other departments. The largest
units delegate more than half of their funds to other units, some units have an even
higher share of delegated funds (red bars). Conditional on delegation, network units
provide funding almost exclusively to regional units. In contrast, it is clearly the
exception that network units take funding from elsewhere (yellow bars). Finally,
there is significant heterogeneity among network units in the use of own funds (blue
bars). These patterns suggest a simple conclusion: Network units primarily host
trust funds, whereas regional units implement them. Each unit also may decide how
much trust fund resources to raise through its own funds.
66
  ¡¢ £¤¥¦§¥ ¨©¦¤ª¥ «¦¬ª ­¤¨®  ©ª¯ ª¦¥
°±²³´µ Left panel shows the six regional units and their distribution of fund types at the level of
individual grants allocated between individual units. Right panel shows the corresponding figures
for the network units. Numbers on the bars show the total number of grants in a given category
provided between FY 2002-13. Regional unit vice presidencies are Africa (AFRVP), East Asia and
Pacific (EAPVP), Europe and Central Asia (ECAVP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LCRVP),
Middle East and North Africa (MNAVP), and South Asia (SARVP). Network unit vice presiden-
cies are Development Economics (DECVP), Finance and Private Sector Development (FPDVP),
Human Development Network (HDNVP), Operations and Country Services (OPSVP), Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management (PRMVP), Sustainable Development Network (SDNVP),
World Bank Institute (WBIVP), and Global Environment Facility (GEFVP).
Source: World Bank (2013g)
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